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Does economic endogeneity of site facilities in recreation demand models lead to statistical 
endogeneity? 
Abstract 
Different kinds of endogeneity problems in Random Utility Models of recreation demand have been 
studied in previous literature. Some site characteristics, like facilities, could be endogenous in an 
economic sense due to the interplay of supply and demand. That is, it may be that more popular recreation 
sites tend to have better site characteristics since managers with limited budgets would be more willing to 
invest in them. If recreation site improvements are more likely to occur at the more popular sites, then 
might this economic endogeneity cause problems for econometric models linking site demand to facilities.  
In this paper, we use Monte Carlo simulations to test whether this economic endogeneity will lead to 
statistical endogeneity. 
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1 Introduction 
Random Utility Models (RUMs) are widely applied in the travel cost technique for valuing recreational 
activities, relating visitation to travel costs and site characteristics. Discrete response models, like 
multinomial logit or conditional logit, are used to estimate people’s choice behaviors. From the 
econometric standpoint, obtaining consistent estimates requires the exogeneity of the independent 
variables like travel costs and site characteristics. 
    Specification problems potentially causing bias in travel cost methods were paid attention to as early as 
1970s, especially the omission of travel time variable and congestion effects. Cesario and Knetsch (1970), 
Brown and Nawas (1973) and Gum and Martin (1975) discussed how to incorporate travel time and 
reduce its multicollinearity with travel cost at the same time; McConnell and Duff (1976) and Wetzel 
(1977) stated that congestion effects, if there were any, should be incorporated into the travel cost model 
to avoid estimation bias. Allen Stevens and Barrett (1981) found that the impact of excluding travel time 
and congestion varied from situation to situation. Caulkins, Bishop and Bouwes (1985) showed that the 
omission of cross-price variables did not necessarily cause bias, and the sign of the omission bias was 
determined by the true economic relationship.  
    Recent studies have been focusing on the possible endogeneity in RUMs. Following Ben Akiva and 
Leerman (1985), Haab and Hicks (1997) raised the issue that the set of alternatives, rather than defined by 
researchers, could be endogenously determined by individuals. They added weighted probabilities to the 
log likelihood function to reflect the probability that certain sites are selected into the set of alternatives, 
and the estimation results turned out to be very different. Murdock (2006) studied unobserved site 
characteristics, which were absorbed into the error term, which could be correlated with the travel cost 
variable. Monte Carlo simulations were used to test whether the proposed approach for addressing this 
endogeneity problem performed better than the traditional methods. Timmins and Murdock (2007) stated 
that the omission of the variable of congestion in the estimation would lead to significant endogeneity 3 
 
problems, since it depended on real visits. They supposed individuals made rational decisions given 
others’ choices and considered Nash equilibrium in repeated games. A quantile regression with 
instrumental variables was applied to get new estimates. Von Haefen and Phaneuf (2008) developed a 
combined revealed and stated preference approach to overcome the endogeneity of unobserved 
determinants. 
    Those endogeneity problems addressed in this literature have mainly focused on the site selection, 
congestion and omitted variables, and are corrected to ensure the consistency of estimates. Now, let’s 
consider site characteristics, for example, facilities. Many studies have found that facilities variables are 
often significant in explaining people’s recreational behaviors. Parson (2003) reported the presence of 
amusement parks and restroom facilities as explanatory variables in the latent utility equation, and their 
estimated coefficients were statistically significant at 95% level of confidence.  Lew and Larson (2005) 
included lifeguard presence and parking availability dummies as two explanatory variables for beach use, 
which were also statistically significant. Von Haefen, Massey and Adamowicz (2005) used bathroom 
availability and public parking in their recreational demand estimation. Yeh, Haab and Sohngen (2006) 
took into account the effects of lifeguard and number of picnic tables when valuing recreation trips to 
beaches. Cutter, Pendleton and DeShazo (2007) considered the effects of toilets, trails, tables and benches 
in their model of recreational demand.  
    At the same time, the supply and types of facilities are also determined by people’s visitation as the 
literature in parks management makes clear.  Lee and Driver (1999) compared three recreation resource 
management frameworks: activity-based management (ABM), experience-based management (EBM) and 
benefits-based management (BBM). BBM is an extension of the first two, aiming at providing public 
recreation opportunities which people benefit from. Shin, Jaakson and Kim (2001) pointed out that 
“Benefits-based management seeks to provide recreation benefits for recreation participants by managing 
the physical environments in which recreation occurs”, and they included facilities and their maintenance 
as one attribute of the setting of recreational sites. Faghri, Lang, Hamad and Henck (2002) mentioned a 4 
 
set of criteria for where to optimally locate park-and-ride facilities, one of which suggested that a site with 
lots of traffic passing through should be a suitable location. Cook (2008) used a benefit transfer method to 
estimate the value of a new long-distance walking trail in a tropical rainforest. If no people went for 
recreational activities in the forest, managers would not be likely to build a walking track since its value 
was low.  
    If we view the managers as the supply side and the recreationists as the demand side, managers change 
facilities in response to recreational demand, and recreational demand varies in response to facilities. The 
interplay of supply and demand makes facilities endogenous in the economic sense. Usually, this will 
cause inconsistency of estimates in econometric models, but not necessarily. Therefore, the objective of 
this paper is to examine the extent to which economic endogeneity of facilities leads to statistical 
endogeneity. If it does, we should use instrumental variables to address this problem; if it does not, we 
don’t have to worry about it. 
    To address the issue, Monte Carlo simulations are applied.  In the simulations, we set values for the 
“true” parameters, simulate choice sets, run regressions, and obtain estimates. If estimates converge to the 
true parameters, they are consistent and the economic endogeneity of facilities does not matter. If they do 
not converge, then facilities are statistically endogenous. The advantage of Monte Carlo simulations is 
that we know what the “truth” is; otherwise, with empirical data, we can test the statistical endogeneity, 
but we cannot judge the consistency of a certain estimator for sure without knowing the true values. 
    In the following sections, we present the basic choice model for our recreation demand simulations.  In 
the simulations, we first assume all explanatory variables including facilities are exogenous to test that the 
approach works for the base case. Next, we let facilities be determined by recreational demand and supply, 
and investigate whether we still get consistent estimates under this circumstance. Then, we conduct 
sensitivity analysis, changing the underlying factors of simulations. Finally, the results from simulations 
are discussed. 5 
 
2 Methods 
2.1 Conditional Logit Models 
In RUMs, the latent utility that person i gains from visiting site j is: 
𝑈?? = ???𝗽 + 𝜀??   
Where ??? includes travel cost, which varies across people and sites, and site characteristics, which only 
varies across sites; 𝜀?? is a random term counting for unobserved preferences. If there are J sites and 
individual i chooses to go to site k, it must be that:  
𝑈?? = max 𝑈?1,𝑈?2,…,𝑈?𝐽  
    The revealed choice variable for this person would be a set of binary responses: 
 𝑦?1,𝑦?2,…,𝑦??,…,𝑦?𝐽  =  0,0,…,1,…,0 . 
    Following McFadden (1974), when 𝜀?? follows a Type I extreme value distribution, the maximization 
of the random utilities yields site choice probabilities given by a conditional logit model where the 
probability that individual i chooses site k is: 
𝑃𝑟? ?  =
𝑒???𝗽
  𝑒??? 𝗽 𝐽
?=1
 . 
The log-likelihood function for the individual is: 
?? = ?𝑛   𝑃𝑟? ?  𝑦??
𝐽
?=1




When we have the choice sets for all recreationists, we can sum their log-likelihood functions and apply 
maximum likelihood to get the estimated coefficients. 6 
 
    The estimated welfare change in RUMs for individual i is: 
∆? ?   =
1
𝗽𝑦    ?𝑛  exp ???
1𝗽   
10
j=1
  − ?𝑛  exp ???
0𝗽   
10
j=1
   
Where ???
1 and ???
0 represent the new status and the initial status respectively. Often they are quality 
changes on one or several sites. 𝗽𝑦   is the estimated coefficient of income variable, the monetary measure 
of utility; it equals the negative of the estimated coefficient of travel cost.  When a particular site 
characteristic l is changed by one unit at all sites, the welfare measure reduces to 𝗽?  /𝗽𝑦   
2.2 Basic Simulation 
To simplify the simulations, we assume the recreational sites are beaches and there are three explanatory 
variables: travel cost (D), beach length (BL) which represents exogenous site characteristics, and facilities 
(F) which will serve as our potentially endogenous site characteristic. Then the latent utility equation 
becomes: 
𝑈?? = 𝐷??𝗽1 + ?𝐿?𝗽2 + 𝐹 ?𝗽3 + 𝜀?? 
Following the estimates reported in Parson (2003), we set “true” values for the population parameters as 
follows: 
𝗽1 = −0.06,𝗽2 = 0.49,𝗽3 = 0.06 
  Then the utility equation becomes: 
 1      𝑈?? = 𝐷?? ×  −0.06  + ?𝐿? × 0.49 + 𝐹 ? × 0.06 + 𝜀?? 
    We assume there are 1,000 people and 10 sites, and the steps of the basic simulation are as follows: 7 
 
Step I: Take 10,000 random draws for 𝐷?? uniformly over the range from 0 to 100, since travel costs are 
varying across people and sites. Take 10 uniform random draws for ?𝐿? from 0 to 2, and 10 uniform 
random draws for 𝐹 ? from 0 to 5, both of which just vary across sites and are the same for all people. 
These random draws form the pseudo data set for explanatory variables. 
Step II: For individual i, extract his/her 𝐷??, ?𝐿? and 𝐹 ?,? = 1,2,…,10, and produce 10 random draws for 
𝜀?? from a Type I extreme value distribution with scale factor equal to one. Following Train (2003), the 
cumulative distribution function for 𝜀?? is: 
𝐹 𝜀??  = exp −exp −𝜀??   
Then its inverse function is:                   𝜀?? = −?𝑛 −?𝑛 𝐹 𝜀??    
Since 𝐹 𝜀??  falls between 0 and 1, we can take 10 random draws from a (0, 1) uniform distribution first 
and then use the inverse CDF function to compute 10 correspondent random numbers for 𝜀??. 
Step III: Use (1) to calculate 𝑈??,? = 1,2,…,10. Pick the maximum, mark it as one and others as zero, and 
we get the pseudo choice variable for individual i. 
Step IV: Repeat Step II and III for 1,000 people to obtain the pseudo choice sets and choices for all 
recreationists, which compose one random sample. 
Step V: Regress the pseudo choice variable on the pseudo choice set data set for 1,000 people and get 𝗽1  , 
𝗽2   and 𝗽3  . Do hypothesis tests, where the hypotheses are that the estimated coefficients are equal to their 
“true” values, and get three t statistics for the three estimates. 
Step VI: Repeat Step II, III, IV and V 1,000 times to generate 1,000 random samples, where the 
explanatory variables remain the same but the error terms are newly drawn for each sample. 8 
 
Step VII: For the t statistics from 1,000 random samples, calculate the fraction at which they are greater 
than 1.96, which is the critical value for t statistics at 5% significance level. For the estimated coefficients 
from 1,000 random samples, calculate the descriptive statistics, such as mean, variance and minimum 
squared error (MSE).  
    Table-1 shows the process of simulating individual i’s choice set in one random sample. 
Table-1: Simulating individual i’s choice set 
Site  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
D  7.79  61.90  4.23  79.48  56.79  31.95  2.87  71.57  89.71  50.87 
F  0.98  4.34  3.48  4.62  2.48  4.98  0.76  1.42  2.45  4.20 
BL  1.02  0.64  1.86  1.45  0.90  1.71  0.33  1.59  1.94  1.31 
ε  -0.12  0.54  3.61  0.17  7.25  0.62  1.02  0.23  -0.81  1.55 
U  -0.03  -2.60  4.48  -3.61  4.43  -0.16  1.05  -3.20  -5.10  -0.61 
y  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
 
    According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), usually there are two types of simulations, one fixed trials 
and the other with random regressors. The simulation above is the former, but we also try the latter. The 
steps are very similar, only with a modification to step VI in which we will also repeat step I for each 
sample. Now, not only the error terms but also the explanatory variables are different for every random 
sample.  
    Table-2 and Table-3 show the simulation results for fixed trials and random regressors. 
Table-2: Basic simulation results-Fraction of t statistics above 1.96  
  𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3   
Fixed Trials  0.039  0.053  0.047 
Random Regressors  0.047  0.047  0.048 
 
    If the null hypotheses are true, each t statistic will follow a standard normal distribution and the fraction 
at which it is greater than 1.96 should be around 0.05 with a large sample. Here we have 1,000 t statistics 9 
 
for each β. The fractions in Table-2 are all around 0.05, so the Monte Carlo simulations with exogenous 
explanatory variables generate consistent estimates, both with fixed trials and with random regressors. 
Table-3: Basic simulation results-Descriptive statistics 
  Fixed Trials  Random Regressors 
  𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3    𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3   
True Value  -0.060  0.490  0.060  -0.060  0.490  0.060 
Mean  -0.060  0.488  0.060  -0.060  0.490  0.061 
Min.  -0.066  0.292  -0.019  -0.067  0.198  -0.094 
Max.  -0.054  0.784  0.142  -0.054  0.835  0.173 
Var.  4.397e-06  3.965e-03  6.770e-04  4.419e-06  5.638e-03  9.542e-04 
MSE.  4.406e-06  3.966e-03  6.764e-04  4.417e-06  5.633e-03  9.545e-04 
 
    Also, since 𝗽1  , 𝗽2   and 𝗽3   are actually random variables, we can use descriptive statistics to study their 
properties. In the simulations of fixed trials, their means are very close to their true values (see Table 3). 
The variance and MSE of 𝗽1   are almost zero, implying the high precision of simulations on this parameter. 
𝗽2   and 𝗽3   have wider ranges, likely because these site variables do not vary across individuals resulting in 
less variation in the data set when compared to the travel cost variable. However, their variances and 
MSEs are still very small. The descriptive statistics convey the same information as the fractions of t 
statistics do. In the simulations of random regressors, the results are similar. 
3 Simulations with Endogeneity 
Next, we make facilities economically endogenous and see whether the estimates still converge to their 
“true” values. The way we introduce economic endogeneity is to assume there are no facilities at the sites 
and then the managers will decide the facility levels at each site based on past visitation. Two cases are 
considered: first, called Case I, when people don’t care about facilities, we examine whether the 
economically endogenous facilities would spuriously affect people’s choices (that is, will the estimated 
conditional logit models suggest a significant parameter estimate for the facilities variable even though 10 
 
the true parameter is zero); second, called Case II, when people do care about facilities, we examine 
whether the economic endogeneity causes bias in the estimated coefficients.  
    In Case I, the process of simulations with fixed trials would be different from the one stated in Section 
2, and we just list the differences below. 
Step I 3a: No data for facilities are created, since there is no facility at the beginning. 
Step III 3a: The utility equation used in this step becomes: 
 2       𝑈?? = 𝐷?? ×  −0.06  + ?𝐿? × 0.49 + 𝜀?? 
Step V 3a: This step includes several sub-steps. 
1)  Average the pseudo choice sets across 1,000 people and get the averaged visit for site j, 
j=1,2,…,10, denoted by ?𝐹𝑃 ? 
2)  Suppose the manager’s supply is linearly related with past visitation, and we assume the supply 
function is: 
 3       𝐹 ? = ?𝐹𝑃 ? × 25 + 𝑒? 
Since only the relative magnitude of utility matters, we don’t include an intercept. 25 is a 
randomly picked constant. It can be any number. We just want to make sure the scale of newly 
provided facilities is similar to that of the exogenous facilities in the basic simulation. The error 
term for the facilities supply function is assumed to have a standard normal distribution, 
incorporating other factors that may affect facility supply. Take 10 random draws from the 
standard normal distribution and calculate the facility level using (3) for each site, which is 
obviously endogenous. 
3)  This is similar to Step V in part 2. We add the supplied facilities to the pseudo data set, and the 
true value for 𝗽3 is zero, rather than 0.06. 11 
 
    The rest of the steps are the same. With random regressors, we just need to repeat Step I for each 
random sample. The results are shown in Table-4 and Table-5. 
    The fractions of t statistics for 𝗽1   and 𝗽2   are around 0.05, so the two estimates are consistent. The 
fractions for 𝗽3   are a little bit higher, around 0.08. We could reject the consistency of 𝗽3   at 5% 
significance level; however, this is a marginal change in the performance of the conditional logit. We 
cannot reject that the parameters for facilities are zero if we set the test size as 10%. If we conducted a 
survey 1,000 times and obtained 1,000 data sets, we would not have a statistically significant impact on 
the facilities parameter in more than 900 data sets. So, although the endogeneity of facilities does have 
some effects on 𝗽3  , they are not very substantial.  
Table-4: Case 1: Simulation results-Fraction of t statistics above 1.96 
  𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3   
Fixed Trials  0.043  0.055  0.080 
Random Regressors  0.048  0.046  0.084 
 
Table-5: Case 1: Simulation results-Descriptive statistics 
  Fixed Trials  Random Regressors 
  𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3    𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3   
True Value  -0.060  0.490  0  -0.060  0.490  0 
Mean  -0.060  0.469  0.021  -0.060  0.471  0.023 
Min.  -0.066  0.163  -0.203  -0.067  0.132  -0.165 
Max.  -0.054  0.860  0.165  -0.054  0.839  0.201 
Var.  4.302e-06  5.359e-03  2.036e-03  4.314e-06  6.892e-03  1.979e-03 
MSE.  4.301e-06  5.801e-03  3.536e-03  4.314e-06  7.254e-03  3.342e-03 
 
    With fixed trials, the mean of 𝗽1   is almost equal to the true value; the variance and MSE are close to 
zero. The mean of 𝗽2   is slightly smaller than the true value, and the variance and MSE are bigger than 
those in the basic simulation. The mean of  𝗽3  , which is the estimated coefficient of the economically 
endogenous facilities, is greater than the true value as we might expect (though the size of this effect is 12 
 
small). The variance and MSE get bigger, too. 𝗽1   , 𝗽2   and 𝗽3   all seem to converge to their true values. So 
the economic endogeneity does not seem to have much influence in this case.  Simulations with random 
regressors generate similar results. For the types of simulations performed here, facilities do not 
spuriously affect people’s behaviors when the facilities in fact do not matter to the individuals.  
    In Case II, we now assume that people do care about facilities, so after the facilities are provided, 
people will update their choice of the best site within their choice sets. We need to account for this in the 
process of simulations with both fixed trials and random regressors by making the following 
modifications to the simulation steps: 
Step V 3b: After the calculation of endogenous facilities, we add them to the pseudo data set and repeat 
Step III and IV to get the updated pseudo choice sets for 1,000 people, where the error terms are kept the 
same and the true 𝗽3 is 0.06. Then the updated pseudo choice sets are used to get estimated coefficients 
and t statistics. 
  The results are found in Table-6 and Table-7. 
Table-6: Case 2: Simulation results-Fraction of t statistics greater than 1.96  
  𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3   
Fixed Trials  0.039  0.060  0.078 
Random Regressors  0.035  0.045  0.089 
 
Table-7: Case 2: Simulation results-Descriptive statistics 
  Fixed Trials  Random Regressors 
  𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3    𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3   
True Value  -0.060  0.490  0.060  -0.060  0.490  0.060 
Mean  -0.060  0.470  0.080  -0.060  0.470  0.083 
Min.  -0.066  0.187  -0.146  -0.067  0.161  -0.112 
Max.  -0.053  0.864  0.272  -0.054  0.770  0.252 
Var.  4.253e-06  5.470e-03  2.063e-03  4.259e-06  6.761e-03  1.970e-03 
MSE.  4.257e-06  5.851e-03  2.455e-03  4.262e-06  7.129e-03  2.470e-03 
 13 
 
    Case II seems to give the same results. The fraction of t statistics above 1.96 for  𝗽1   is smaller than 0.05, 
so we can accept that 𝗽1   is a consistent estimator of 𝗽1. In the descriptive statistics, the mean of 𝗽1   is 
more or less the same as the true value and it has a relatively small range, variance and MSE. Recall that 
the travel cost variable varies across sites and across individuals which contributes to the robustness of its 
estimated parameter. The means of 𝗽2   and 𝗽3   with both simulations are greater than the true values, 
coincidentally by around 0.02 for both of them. For 𝗽2  , we can view the differences as slight deviations 
since the true value of 𝗽2is 0.49, and 0.02 0.49   ≈ 4%. The consistency of 𝗽2   is not affected very much. 
For 𝗽3  , the much more substantial since the true value of 𝗽3 is 0.06, and 0.02 0.06   ≈ 33.33%, so the 
endogeneity has some influence over 𝗽3  , inflating its value by 33%.  Since the estimated travel cost 
parameters are essentially the true values and are estimated very precisely, we would expect that the error 
in any welfare measures on the endogenously supplied facilities to be driven by the error in the facilities 
parameter.  Despite the 33% increase in the average facilities parameter, the fractions of t statistics above 
1.96 for 𝗽3   is less than 0.10 implying that the chance is more than 90% that we get consistent estimates. 
4 Sensitivity Analyses 
To investigate how underlying factors in Monte Carlo simulations would influence the simulation results, 
we conduct sensitivity analysis by changing three elements of the simulation.  First, we change the 
number of sites from 10 to 5 and to 15.  Second, we use discrete facilities instead of continuous ones.  , 
Third, we randomly pick numbers as the “true” population parameters rather than use the values from the 
Parson (2003) study. Since the fractions of t statistics could tell whether the estimates are consistent or 
not, we just list the fractions here. “RP” stands for randomly drawn parameters, and we pick 5 groups of 
randomly drawn parameters as the true values for βs with both fixed trials and random regressors. For 
each group of randomly drawn parameters, 𝗽1 is uniformly drawn over the range of -0.1 and 0; 𝗽2 is 
uniformly drawn over the range of 0 and 1; 𝗽3 is uniformly drawn over the range of 0 and 0.1. The ranges 
are chosen with respect to their true values in basic simulations, allowing variations to some extent. 14 
 
    Given an overall review of these data, changing underlying factors of simulations does not change the 
results very much. The number of sites matter to some extent. As the number of sites grows bigger, the 
effects of endogeneity become more significant. Variations in the true parameters may have some 
influence, but if we average across the five groups of randomly assigned true values, the influence may 
fades.  Overall, the patterns observed in the above simulations appear robust for the types of sensitivity 
analyses conducted here. 
Table-8: Sensitivity Analysis-Fractions of t statistics 
    Fixed Trials  Random Regressors 
    𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3    𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3   
Basic 
Simulation 
5 Sites  0.044  0.049  0.057  0.049  0.045  0.048 
15 Sites  0.051  0.042  0.049  0.047  0.036  0.058 
Discrete  0.040  0.050  0.040  0.055  0.062  0.048 
RP 1  0.049  0.051  0.044  0.043  0.045  0.039 
RP 2  0.041  0.055  0.059  0.044  0.051  0.068 
RP 3  0.054  0.052  0.054  0.055  0.043  0.055 
RP 4  0.036  0.042  0.045  0.034  0.053  0.058 
RP 5  0.054  0.042  0.053  0.058  0.043  0.049 
Case I 
Simulation 
5 Sites  0.042  0.048  0.057  0.045  0.052  0.054 
15 Sites  0.061  0.058  0.111  0.046  0.050  0.101 
Discrete  0.052  0.048  0.081  0.058  0.052  0.086 
RP 1  0.059  0.053  0.107  0.039  0.057  0.094 
RP 2  0.041  0.066  0.068  0.044  0.077  0.092 
RP 3  0.048  0.078  0.101  0.055  0.051  0.087 
RP 4  0.037  0.059  0.093  0.036  0.074  0.092 
RP 5  0.054  0.045  0.114  0.057  0.050  0.075 
Case II 
Simulation 
5 Sites  0.048  0.048  0.056  0.048  0.044  0.057 
15 Sites  0.051  0.051  0.090  0.044  0.052  0.092 
Discrete  0.050  0.050  0.070  0.059  0.063  0.077 
RP 1  0.048  0.050  0.099  0.044  0.056  0.087 
RP 2  0.044  0.061  0.072  0.033  0.076  0.078 
RP 3  0.059  0.078  0.093  0.061  0.053  0.066 
RP 4  0.032  0.055  0.086  0.036  0.073  0.097 
RP 5  0.056  0.049  0.106  0.057  0.050  0.075 
 
    In the table, almost all the fractions of t statistics of 𝗽1   are around 0.05. No matter whether facilities are 
economically endogenous or not,  𝗽1   is consistent. If we are only interested in the estimated coefficient of 
travel cost, we may not need to worry about any economic endogeneity in facilities. The fractions of t 15 
 
statistics of 𝗽2   are a little bit higher than 0.05 in Case I and Case II; the fractions of t statistics of 𝗽3   are 
much greater, but smaller than 0.10 most of the time. Thus, as discussed before, the economic 
endogeneity of facilities would have effects on both estimates of beach length and facilities, which may 
be attributed to the fact that they both vary across sites but not people. Although the endogenous facilities 
in Case II can have a substantially inflated effect on the facilities parameter, based on the statistical tests 
the estimates are generally inconsistent with a probability less than 0.10.  
5 Tests for Aggregation Effects 
In the econometric sense, the interplay of supply and demand would seem likely to cause simultaneous 
endogeneity among equations; that is to say, the economic endogeneity of the way that facilities are 
supplied might be expected to result in statistical endogeneity. However, the results of the simulations do 
not show strong evidence that the estimates are inconsistent. We notice that the way we made facilities 
economically endogenous was to build facilities on the average visits of 1,000 people. In other words, 
facilities are economically endogenous at an aggregate level, and the effect could be diminished when we 
come to the individual level. Put differently, we assigned the best facilities to the sites that had the highest 
visitation (i.e., the sites that were best on average).  However, the site that is best on average will not best 
in each individuals choice set, especially given the way we randomly constructed the travel costs.  
Perhaps the aggregation across all people results in a supply of facilities that remains relatively 
uncorrelated with what is best in the individual choice sets.  To test whether the aggregation across all 
people influences the results, we change the supply mechanism a little bit. Instead of averaging across all 
people in one sample, we divide 1,000 people into 10 groups and 100 groups respectively. Under each 
division principle, we average past visitation within every group, and the facilities are correlated with the 
group’s average visits to each site. Now the economically endogenous facilities are different for different 
groups. We apply the new mechanism to Case I and Case II. The results are shown in Table-9 and Table-
10. 16 
 
Table-9: Simulation results with endogeneity in different aggregate levels-Fractions of t statistics 
    Fixed Trials  Random Regressors 
  Average 
Across  𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3    𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3   
Case I  100  0.056  0.444  1  0.053  0.554  1 
10  0.059  1  1  0.062  0.991  1 
Case II  100  0.055  0.396  1  0.047  0.504  0.998 
10  0.08  1  1  0.089  0.989  1 
 
Table-10: Simulation results with endogeneity in different aggregate levels-Descriptive Statistics 
   100 
people    Fixed Trials  Random Regressors 
    𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3    𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3   
Case I 
True Value  -0.060  0.490  0  -0.060  0.490  0 
Mean  -0.060  0.361  0.152  -0.060  0.340  0.152 
Min.  -0.067  0.184  0.075  -0.067  0.108  0.071 
Max.  -0.054  0.613  0.240  -0.054  0.590  0.242 
Var.  4.881e-06  3.829e-03  6.303e-04  4.276e-06  3.898e-03  6.329e-04 
MSE.  4.876e-06  2.041e-02  9.086e-03  4.277e-06  2.648e-02  9.070e-03 
Case II 
True Value  -0.060  0.490  0.060  -0.060  0.490  0.060 
Mean  -0.060  0.367  0.201  -0.060  0.345  0.201 
Min.  -0.067  0.193  0.123  -0.067  0.102  0.108 
Max.  -0.054  0.595  0.298  -0.054  0.593  0.296 
Var.  4.997e-06  3.985e-03  6.844e-04  4.230e-06  4.108e-03  6.865e-04 
MSE.  5.007e-06  1.905e-02  2.041e-02  4.256e-06  2.511e-02  2.056e-02 
 
   10 
people    Fixed Trials  Random Regressors 
    𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3    𝗽1    𝗽2    𝗽3   
Case I 
True Value  -0.060  0.490  0  -0.060  0.490  0 
Mean  -0.061  0.155  0.324  -0.061  0.155  0.324 
Min.  -0.068  -0.099  0.284  -0.068  -0.099  0.284 
Max.  -0.053  0.364  0.363  -0.053  0.364  0.363 
Var.  4.961e-06  3.021e-03  1.593e-04  4.961e-06  3.020e-03  1.593e-04 
MSE.  5.791e-06  0.115  0.070  5.791e-06  0.115  0.070 
Case II 
True Value  -0.060  0.490  0.060  -0.060  0.490  0.060 
Mean  -0.062  0.169  0.346  -0.062  0.169  0.346 
Min.  -0.070  -0.066  0.295  -0.070  -0.066  0.296 
Max.  -0.054  0.390  0.387  -0.054  0.390  0.387 
Var.  5.171e-06  3.360e-03  1.732e-04  5.171e-06  3.360e-03  1.732e-04 
MSE.  7.578e-06  0.107  0.082  7.578e-06  0.107  0.082 
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    As we gradually reduce the aggregation level, making the facilties more correlated with the individual 
choice sets, the effect of economic endogeneity becomes more and more significant. When we average 
across 100 people, the fractions of t statistics for  𝗽3   that are above 1.96 are 1, so 𝗽3   does not converge to 
the true value and we can reject the null hypotheses in all cases. The fractions of t statistics of 𝗽2   also 
increase to around 0.50, so 𝗽2   is not consistent, either. 𝗽1   , being based on a variable with individual and 
site specific variation, is not influenced under this situation. 
    When we average across 10 people, not only are 𝗽3   and 𝗽2   inconsistent but 𝗽1   is also affected some. 
The fractions of its t statistics go up to 0.08 or 0.09. Although the probability at which 𝗽1   is not consistent 
is still small, the endogeneity of facilities does have some spillover effects on the estimated coefficient of 
travel cost. 
    We could see how the properties of the estimated coefficients change compared to previous simulations 
more clearly through the descriptive statistics. For 𝗽1  , when we average across 100 people, the means 
remain the same as the true value. The variances and MSEs, although still very small, are bigger than 
previous ones. When we average across 10 people, the means are slightly smaller than the true value, and 
the ranges keep getting bigger. For 𝗽2  , when we average across 100 people, the means are smaller than 
the true value; when we average across 10 people, the means become much smaller. The variances and 
MSEs are getting bigger. The bias is downward. For 𝗽3  , the bias is upward. The means are much greater 
than the true values. As the aggregation effect declines, the means almost double, with a great increase in 
MSEs. Thus, when the economic endogeneity of facilities approaches the individual level, the coefficient 
of beach length tends to be underestimated (attenuated) and the coefficient of facilities tends to be 
overestimated. Both of the estimates are inconsistent. Actually, since the mean of 𝗽1   starts to decline 
when we average across 10 people, we might even expect that 𝗽1   would become inconsistent with 
downward bias if we had many more people and the aggregation level was very low. 18 
 
    When the economic endogeneity effect dominates the aggregation effect, the economic endogeneity of 
facilities will lead to statistical endogeneity, which makes the estimated coefficient of facilities 
inconsistent. Here, the other two estimated coefficients are influenced, too. It may arise from the fact that 
facilities are not only correlated with error terms, but also correlated with the other two explanatory 
variables. A popular site would have a longer beach or be closer to people’s houses, and the popularity is 
proportional to facilities. Thus, facilities are positively correlated with beach length, and negatively 
correlated with travel cost. So 𝗽2   would have a downward bias when 𝗽3   is upward biased; it is also the 
case with 𝗽1  , since 𝗽1   is negative. It could be possible that, with a low aggregation level, even if facilities 
are not included as one explanatory variable in the estimation, as long as they do contribute to people’s 
choices, their economic endogeneity might still have significant effects through their correlations with 
other site characteristics and travel cost. Plus, within the settings, the estimated marginal welfare change 
due to a change in facilities at all sites is −𝗽3   𝗽1     . So if 𝗽3   is not a consistent estimate, the welfare 
estimate is also biased, which has important policy implications.  
6 Conclusions and Future Study 
Site characteristics make contributions to explaining the popularity of recreational sites. Facilities, like 
parking lots, restrooms, picnic tables and so on, have been identified by previous studies on recreational 
demand as having a statistically significant on people’s utility equations. On the other hand, previous 
studies on recreational management also show that better facilities are provided at sites where more 
people go, which means that facilities are typically economically endogenous. 
    Usually, the interplay of supply and demand will cause simultaneous endogeneity and then lead to 
inconsistent estimates; however, the Monte Carlo simulations examined here do not strongly support that 
facilities are statistically endogenous when the supply is based on aggregate demand. In fact, the 
estimates still converge to the population parameters at a probability of more than 90% even though the 
mean facilities parameters were overstated by 33%. Because in our simulation design the individuals 19 
 
experience a wide range of travel costs, there likely remain sufficient differences between the sites that 
are best for an individual and the sites that were best in aggregate.  This effect likely minimizes any 
widespread inconsistency of the facilities parameters even in the endogenous supply case.  We test this 
suspicion by diminishing the aggregation level. The simulation results then become very susceptible to 
statistical endogeneity of facilities. Therefore, the economic endogeneity effect on the estimation is 
greatly reduced by the aggregation effect for our simulation.  
    To clarify, we caution readers against drawing too much from our Case I and Case II simulations 
results that indicate a high level of consistency of the parameters since the offsetting effect of the 
aggregation could be caused by the basic property of our simulations. Here we randomly draw numbers as 
the travel cost, which means that both people and sites are fully dispersed across our hypothetical 
landscape.  That is, our simulations do not involve any spatial clustering of individuals which implies 
maximal variation in the individual specific travel costs.  As a result, on average, the probability of 
visitation should be almost the same for all sites. And it is the case in our simulation results. When we 
average the visits across all people, we find that each of the 10 sites has a probability of being visited of 
about 0.10. So it does not make much difference from the case in which managers do not consider past 
visitation and construct similar facilities on all sites.  On the contrary, it would be common that 
recreationists cluster at some areas, like cities, and sites such as beaches are dispersed along a shoreline. 
Then there would be some sites that are more frequently visited than others. In fact, this situation is much 
closer to reality. Lupi and Feather (1998) put recreational sites into three categories: the most popular 
ones, the ones which are the subject of policy analysis and remaining sites. In their survey of sport fishing 
in Minnesota, Lake Mille Lacs dominated all other lakes; Lake of the Woods, Lake Minnetonka and Lake 
Leech were the second popular; when it came to other lakes, the number of visitors dramatically declined. 
So, in this case, even if we aggregate across all people, the popular sites wouldn’t disappear.  
     When dealing with real data, if there is a large degree of spatial dispersion among recreationists when 
compared to site locations, we might be inclined to neglect the possible economic endogeneity of 20 
 
facilities; however, if the dispersion of recreationists is limited (perhaps because they live in spatially 
clustered regions so will have similar travel costs) then the economic endogeneity may be more 
problematic.  In such situations, statistical techniques such as apply instrumental variables may be 
warranted.  Future directions for our subsequent investigations include incorporating these situations of 
disproportionately popular sites and spatial clustering of travel costs into our simulations and 
investigating whether the economic endogeneity of facilities will cause statistical endogeneity under those 
circumstances. That examination will provide more robust conclusions which would allow researchers to 
identify the types of situations likely to cause more or less of a concern about the impacts of 
endogenously supplied site characteristics. 
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